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Charity, Philanthropy, Public Service or Enterprise:
What are the Big Questions of Nonprofit Management
Today?
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University

Introduction
For some people in public affairs and administration, nonprofit
management represents an alternative form of public service; a career path
somewhat apart from a career in government service. For others, nonprofit
management is a relatively narrow interest growing out of the historical
development of service contracting with the nonprofit sector – that rather
amorphous entity consisting currently, we are told, of about 1.4 million nontaxed entities, 825,000 of which are 501 (c) 3 corporations, together with
about 70,000 foundations (Smith and Lipsky, 1992; Lohmann and Lohmann,
2002, 453-468; NCCS, 2006). For others, nonprofit management is a
deliberate career path, and for a relatively smaller number, voluntary action
(aka community action or community development) is a calling – an
opportunity to make a difference in the world.
This essay takes a birds-eye view of the topic of nonprofit
management, looking at what I see as the “big issues” in nonprofit
management today.

1. Sector of What?
My first ‘big question’ is what exactly is ‘the third’ a sector of? Society?
Polity? Economy? Nation? Culture? All (or none) of the above? Perhaps the
most common answer to this question in third sector studies today is that the
third sector is a cluster of tax-exempt/ tax deductible organizations that
together constitute civil society and can be contrasted with ‘market’ and
‘state’ organizations. I and many others find this answer problematic on a
large number of fronts. My own answer comes in the form of an assertion

that the notion of a ‘nonprofit sector’ of tax-exempt, tax-deductible
organizations properly belongs in a more expansive vision known as the
social economy. This model was articulated more than a century ago by
French scholars, offered up several times recently by French and Canadian
scholars, is thriving in several other domains but is still not widely
recognized by nonprofit scholars in the U.S. In its canonical European form,
the social economy refers to the totality of nonprofits including foundations,
together with cooperatives, ‘mutuals’ or membership associations. (See
Quarter, 1992; Quarter, Mook and Richmond, 2003)
A distinctive U.S. version of social economy, comparable in all
important respects to the international view, is already a legal and
institutional reality; inherent in the various sections of the U.S. Tax Code
from 501 (a), through (d), including the roughly two dozen variants of Section
501 (c), as well as Section 528 and a few other choice locations. All together,
the IRS descriptive information on its public charities and nonprofits web
pages mentions 60 distinct types of organizations.
(www.irs.gov/charities/index.html) These provisions of federal law are
reinforced by and interact with state incorporation statutes and tax codes
and the assorted references of a number of other federal, state and local codes
and regulations. Taken together, they clearly outline a U.S. social economy,
of which what the code calls ‘public charities’ and ‘foundations’ are important,
but not exclusive, components. In light of existing policy, does it make sense
to continue to focus on only two of this large and interrelated set of perhaps
three dozen defined categories of nonprofit entities, and to call them ‘the
nonprofit sector’? I don’t believe that it does.
Surely, the nonprofit sector, as narrowly construed, is an important
entity in and of itself, and also historically important in recent decades, in
much the way that the steel and auto industries were in the 1940’s for
example, but the third sector is nothing like the sort of free-standing entity
sometimes portrayed by nonprofit scholars who equate it with civil society or
differentiate it alone from government and market sectors. Legally,
economically, politically and socially, it is part and parcel of something
larger, and that something is best termed the social economy. The
fundamental reason for this is the distinctive set of economic concerns –
defining the appropriate and necessary legal restraints on gifts and donations
and accountability and control of the pooled assets and property given – that
have formed the framework of all U.S. ‘nonprofit law’ from the very
beginning. And it is law – constitutional, corporate and charitable trust law
in particular – around which the institutions, associations and formal
organizations of the third sector have been formed.
In this context, we need to look much more closely at whether, by the
term third sector we mean the ‘natural’ or spontaneous social emergents like
voluntary associations and social movements of civil society--or whether, we
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mean the legal infrastructure of contracts, corporations, and charitable
trusts. Is the third sector, in other words, a matter of behavioral, or of
institutional analysis, or both? And, if in the highly interdisciplinary context
of contemporary third sector studies the answer comes back ‘both’, how are
we to take care to assure that each is given its proper due?
The official U.S. social economy, as it exists in the nomenclature of the
tax code and other public policy, encompasses public charities and
foundations, along with a variety of other forms of social enterprise. This
includes cooperatives, labor unions, political parties, and other membership
organizations, a variety of non-exempt advocacy activities, various ‘public
trusts’, mutual benefit entities and an additional assortment of ventures.1
The big issue facing nonprofit management currently is whether,
indeed, “the nonprofit sector” of public charities and foundations is a major
conceptual category, even a “civil society” as some have suggested, and where
in this scheme of things, these other organizations belong. Can it be that this
broad range of legally characterized ‘nonprofit’ efforts including political
parties and interest and advocacy groups, cooperatives, credit unions and
unincorporated associations of all sorts should also be of interest?
A related, secondary question is whether the concept of “civil society”
has any interest at all for nonprofit management? Or, is civil society--as
currently construed--only a topic concerned with individuals (qua citizens and
civic persons) and small groups, while nonprofit management is concerned
principally with organizations and corporations? I am aware that this may
appear a somewhat subtle distinction, but it is the tip of a wedge that has
big, bold implications for research, scholarly activity and ultimately
management practice. In any meaningful current model of civil society, do
board-governed corporations that have delegated significant responsibilities
for their operations to part-or-full time executives and subordinate staff
members in their employ even appear, much less figure prominently?
When we speak of a topic like nonprofit management to an audience of
public affairs, public administration and public policy scholars and students
inclined to approach this entire domain of nonprofit management as an
alternative to government service or public management, the expanded vision
of the social economy covers far more territory than the more limited sphere
of the conventional ‘nonprofit sector’.

2. Has Entrepreneurship Trumped Philanthropy?

1

See www.irs.gov/charities/index.html. For those wishing to pursue the matter further, the entire
tax code is available online at http://www.fourmilab.ch/ustax/www/t26-A-1-F-I-501.html.
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Another of the big issues of nonprofit management – and a direct outgrowth
of the ever-present urge to be ‘more business-like’ – is the proper positioning
for a broad array of concepts of social entrepreneurship. By this term, I mean
to suggest the full range of incentive-based approaches to social
improvement, and the accompanying tropes of enterprise borrowed from the
business world.2 There can be little doubt that a great many nonprofit
organizations – for example, hospitals – see themselves and are seen as
dynamic enterprises, rather than staid, old philanthropies and see their
collective activities as an industry rather than an institution.
To suggest in the current American context that the enterprise of
health care is (or should be) predominantly philanthropic – literally,
conducted for the love of mankind – is to risk being treated as the proverbial
skunk at the picnic! It is one of the foremost tropes of enterprise today to
acknowledge that health care is an industry and treating the sick is a
business. Much the same may be said for a range of other fee-based social
services, and other public charities. Current management thinking in public
administration and related management disciplines is doing a great deal to
advance these ideas. And, in general, the larger the enterprise – the more
people and money involved – the more likely it appears that the enterprise
model and entrepreneurial visions have supplanted more traditional models
of philanthropy.
The big issue this poses for nonprofit management is whether there
will be a place remaining in this increasingly entrepreneurial world for the
non-incentive based, and non-financially viable activities, and what that
place will be. Accounting standards and model nonprofit statutes have
already been revised to reflect these changes. Where, in a world of enterprise,
is one to find a place for obligation and philanthropy? This is a very large
question, indeed.

3. What is Nonprofit Organization?
I would also like to note briefly another important definitional concern.
It is a relatively routine matter in contemporary nonprofit research to refer to
“nonprofit organizations” as if there were something recognizable,
homogeneous and distinct in the ways in which people organize themselves
2

It is consistent with the notion of three sectors to differentiate three principal motivational
patterns as well: incentive-based approaches – roughly, expectations of rewards as motivation can be distinguished from the rules-based approach of the ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy –
with the deontological ‘rewards’ of duty (including the duties of charity) and the relations-based
approach of the ideal type of the commons with the interpersonal rewards of stewardship and
philia, often translated as fellowship, ‘civic friendship’, or philanthropy, in the most extreme case,
love of mankind.
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under nonprofit corporate and tax-exempt auspices. I would ask whether, in
the instances most frequently studied – nonprofit health care, and social
service settings and “private” schools and universities – this is the case, or if
we have not yet gotten to the real nature of these organizations,
sociologically, politically or economically.
The real question in the case of the ordinarily conceived nonprofit
sector of 501 (c) 3 and 501 (c) 4 organizations is whether a legal contingency –
the fact that a class (or several classes) of nonprofit organization in the U.S.
social economy must strictly observe particular nondistribution constraints as
defined by the IRS in order not to pay corporate income taxes and to accept
tax-exempt donations – is sufficient grounds on which to define a type of
organization. Much of the literature of nonprofit studies is written as though
the answer were unequivocally affirmative. Yet, details about the nature of
this distinctive form of organization are somewhat scanty, and, as
functioning organizations, most nonprofits look a great deal like ad hoc
blends of main street business offices and government bureaus.
This is not a criticism the relatively large number of organizational
analyses – including well-known works by Bielefeld and Galeskowitz (1997),
which focused on management strategies, Smith and Lipsky (1992), which
focused on purchase of services, Anthony and Young (1984), which focused on
management control, or multiple works by Lester Salamon and Helmut
Anheier, which focus in general on what I would call the characteristics of
“thirdness.” These and literally dozens of other studies of nonprofit
organization, all make interesting, useful and valuable contributions. But, do
they clearly and convincingly make the case for ‘the nonprofit organization’
as a distinct and recognizable organizational form?
It is relatively easy to suggest that they do not. They do not give us a
clear picture of a distinctive ‘nonprofit organization’, but instead suggest a
kind of opportunistic bureaucracy, combining in some unspecified, ad hoc
ways, the incentives of the firm with the rules (or policies) of the bureaucracy.
In other words, the nonprofit organization of the present is a hybrid. Almost
all of the ‘nonprofit organizations’ I am aware of, by which I mean nonprofit
hospitals, clinics, colleges, schools, and a vast array of social services from
adoption agencies to work programs, incorporated in their states, governed by
volunteer boards and managed by careerist and professional managers, look
very much like neo-Weberian bureaucracies operating under such ad hoc
mixtures of rule-based (or “policy-based”) and incentive-based regimes.
Perhaps they are most analogous to the mule. Is a mule a unique animal?
Yes, it is a limited form of uniqueness. Formed from the union of a horse and
a donkey, mules are sterile and incapable of reproducing their own kind. One
can only wonder how far the mule analogy will hold: In particular, can this
form of ‘nonprofit organization’ survive and reproduce beyond the social
circumstances (most notably government contracting) that gave rise to it?
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Nonprofit management across numerous disciplines continues to
restrict our attention and practice to an overly narrow and limited range of
organizational possibilities (Lohmann, 1990). This should be an issue of
major scholarly and theoretical concern, for presently, all that the future of
the third sector appears to holds is more opportunistic bureaucracy within
the regime of interest-group liberalism or ‘private government’.
As long as we cling to the false view that only ‘nonprofit organizations’
consisting of rule- and incentive-driven bureaucratic hierarchies can be
practical, efficient and effective, a vast range of highly interesting
alternatives, variations and possibilities will continue to allude us.
Everything from flat hierarchies, to feminist organizations, groups, networks,
associations, orders, movements, and open spaces and many, many other
organized alternatives will continue to be shunted aside or downplayed in the
name of good management, as unwise and impractical. Make no mistake:
These forms will continue to happen, but they will do so beyond the
theoretical reaches of our research and theory, or treated as anomalies. Many
of us who have seen alternative possibilities will continue to regard this as
sad and unfortunate.

4. Can We Achieve Philanthropic Sufficiency?
Yet another big question is located squarely within the traditional
world of philanthropy. To understand it fully requires just a bit of
background. A modern doctrine we might call public philanthropy has been
an article of neoconservative faith for most of the past century. It has
emerged most recently as an alternative to, and rival of, the welfare state.
This is the seemingly widespread belief that the public (governmental)
sector should be as small as possible, and taxes as low as possible. As a
result, important matters of public concern like the care of the poor, the
mentally ill, the old and the weak are no longer regarded as suitable subjects
for public engagement, except insofar as policy relegates their care to
nongovernmental ‘voluntary’ organizations.
To several generations of progressives, including Jane Addams and
Teddy Roosevelt, limited government and large doses of voluntary action
were articles of faith. Although the historical record has been considerably
glossed over of late, New Deal liberals and welfare statists from FDR to
Walter Mondale also gave what they believed was proper homage to this
doctrine of limited government. The American public sector, even at its
largest and most expansive, has never accounted for more than a small
fraction of the entire U.S. economy. Old order conservatives, however, were
unrelenting in their commitment to their belief that any governmental public
sector was too large ( Cornuelle, 1965). They have been joined in this view in
6

recent decades by a mix of modern libertarians, social conservatives and
others to form a ‘neo-conservatism’ that arose in reaction against the Great
Society and endorsed nothing short of the withering away of the state (a
phenomenon characterized by a wide range of political labels and slogans
from “privatization” to “starving the beast” and “compassionate
conservatism”).
In the hands of political leaders like Presidents Reagan and G.H.W.
Bush, a key provision of this visionary transformation was a doctrine we can
call philanthropic sufficiency: The claim that voluntary action – private
giving and volunteer labor for the public good – offer a sufficient and
politically preferable way of dealing with the social problems the
Progressives steered toward government. This doctrine has never been far
from the surface in the last several decades and resurfaced during recent
Presidential campaigns in the form of the slogan, “compassionate
conservatism” and in the “faith-based services” initiative.
This neo-conservative political doctrine was neatly encoded in the
INDEPENDENT SECTOR mantra first unveiled in 1987: Give Five. The exact
formula for philanthropic sufficiency encoded in that slogan combines
targeted donations of five percent of personal incomes in the form of
donations and five hours a week spent volunteering. It was implied that this
would be sufficient to achieve the neoconservative dream of a society
combining low taxes and high levels of philanthropy. This offers, on the
whole, a modest alternative to the proverbial tithing, of biblical proportions
that set the level of giving twice as high – one tenth.
However, the reality is that despite more than 25 years of a variety of
public policy initiatives based on the presumption of philanthropic
sufficiency the nonprofit sector has not been able to pick up the slack. As the
final phrase on the IS “Give Five” webpage now notes, “The nonprofit sector
cannot take the place of government programs, nor can it single-handedly
cure the ills and disparities of society.”3 The main reason that this appears to
be so is that we continue to exist in what might be termed a steady state of
philanthropic insufficiency; the aggregate level of private giving in the U.S.
remains currently just under two percent, and has never risen above half the
IS target – one fourth of the historic tithe. Moreover, there is no sign it will
do so anytime soon.
The big questions this raises can be addressed in a number of different
ways. In our highly partisan time, “blue” liberals will interpret this as a
failure of neoconservative doctrine, and “red” neo-conservatives will respond
in kind. For the practice of nonprofit management, however, the issue is
whether and how it may be possible to break the glass ceiling of

3

http://www.independentsector.org/give5/givefive.html
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philanthropic insufficiency and generate aggregate giving greater than 2
percent.

5. Are We More Business-like Yet?
Everyone connected with nonprofit management at one time or another
comes into contact with business people who will offer, in all seriousness, the
suggestion that nonprofit organizations need to be more business-like.
Currently, I encounter this most frequently in the form of young scholars in
schools of business who submit manuscripts to Nonprofit Management and
Leadership that begin with a stock introduction informing readers that
nonprofit management has much to learn from the superior insights of
business management. Never do they acknowledge that there is an
opportunity for reciprocal learning, with which I agree heartily; only that
nonprofits have much to learn. Non-business school reviewers regularly
retort with references to Enron, which before its collapse had been named
America’s Most Innovative Company six years in a row.
In most instances, what constitutes being “more businesslike” is
relatively innocuous and common-sense advice suggesting little more than
strictures to: be instrumental and goal oriented, and prudent with scarce
resources; to act wisely and try not to do stupid or foolish things. In many
instances, good, common sense suggestions flow from this. It is astounding to
many of us, for example, how many nonprofit managers at any given moment
haven’t the vaguest concept of the time value of money, how to do a budget,
or the elementary insight that sometimes doing one thing means you cannot
do another (i.e., that opportunity costs exist).
However, the advice to be more business-like in nonprofit management,
while usually good, can also be extraordinarily bad advice. In at least one
instance, there is mounting evidence that has been published in both
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly and Nonprofit Management and
Leadership and several other places that the conventional, business-like,
wisdom is not only wrong, but dangerously so. (Tuckman and Chang, 1991;
Greenlee and Trussel, 2001; Trussel, 2004 )
The advice usually given is some form of: Nonprofit managers, keep your
administrative costs (aka overhead or indirect costs) as low as possible, and
always under 10%. Ditto for fundraising costs. For the largest nonprofits –
hospitals and colleges, and a few of the largest social services, for example –
this is generally a pretty easy standard to live by. Managers of small
nonprofits have recognized the basically suicidal nature of such prescriptions.
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6. Will We Pay More Attention to the Advice or the Evidence?
When considering this question, another question also arises. That is
whether research evidence – not will o’ the wisp flights of fancy, ideology or
fashion, but good, hard, solid empirical evidence – can ever really genuinely
guide management practice in nonprofit settings? Keeping your overhead
costs low is one of the most durable myths of nonprofit management –
particularly among business-oriented board members and funding sources
One can easily find evidence of this belief scattered widely: In the quibbling
attentions of board members over office supplies or telephone costs in the
agency budget, to the protestations of foundations that they “will not pay
overhead” for certain grants. It is even found inscribed in legislation: The
Older Americans Act, for example, solemnly mandates that no more than 8%
of the cost of Title III aging services may be expended on administrative
costs.
The implication of such well-meaning advice is clear, and closely related
to the philanthropic sufficiency argument above: If only malingering
managers and self-interested bureaucrats can trim wasteful and extravagant
excesses, the nonprofit sector will be a better place! Yet, a growing body of
research evidence affirms what most nonprofit managers already know: that
advice is also dead wrong; and dangerously so. A large body of literature
provides unmistakable evidence, gathered from a combined total of random
samples of nearly 10,000 non-profit organizations, that low administrative
costs are one of the principal predictors of fiscal distress in nonprofits
(Tuchman and Chang, 1991; Greenlee and Trussel, 2001; Trussel, Greenlee
and Brady, 2004; Hodge and Piccolo, 2005). The explanation for this finding
is remarkably simple and common-sensical: Low administrative costs aid and
abet fiscal distress in nonprofit organizations, by restricting the management
capacity of the organization to deal with distress – lost grants and contracts,
insufficient assets, downturns in fundraising, and the like. It makes sense,
and a growing body of research evidence supports this point.
As statistical evidence goes, this may be one of the best substantiated in
nonprofit studies. (Large, national random samples, no contradictory
findings, etc.) Yet, 15 years after the first such finding was reported , the
impact on practice has been negligible and, I predict, will continue to be so,
simply because it flies in the face of not one, but two very powerful myths.
The first myth has already been mentioned: that low administrative cost is
an unqualified good. The second is that the impact of administrative costs is
evenly distributed across all organizations. In reality, low administrative
costs are much easier to achieve in large organizations, and the vast majority
of nonprofit organizations are small.
Thus, the question of whether nonprofit management practice can ever
really be empirically grounded is a serious question.
9

7. Will Nonprofit Boards Ever Be Well-Run?
Now let me turn to an issue of another sort. As an editor, I am
constantly struck by the number of well-meaning manuscripts that pass over
my desk on the general topic of how to improve the operation of nonprofit
boards of directors. Roughly 20% of all manuscripts we receive at Nonprofit
Management and Leadership deal with some aspect of the topic of boards
and board governance. The subject seems to hold a nearly infinite fascination
for nonprofit researchers. And, I might note, another widespread myth for
which anything beyond anecdotal evidence is currently lacking is that
nonprofit boards are generally pretty slipshod, run-amok ventures of
volunteers who don’t quite measure up to the high standards of the corporate
boards market where members are paid for their efforts. I wish to suggest
that the question of whether or not claims about the general ineffectiveness
of nonprofit boards are true – whether or not nonprofit boards are well run
and effective at what they do while nonprofit boards are not – suffers from a
high degree of categorical confusion.
In my view, the issue of board governance suffers from the confusion of
mistaking what is inherently a political (in the Greek sense, perhaps better
rendered as civic) task of governing the affairs of a nonprofit organization for
a purely technical one of achieving recognizable results. One of the broader
unrealized implications of what is probably the most widely cited recent
work on boards - Herman and Renz’ (1997) research on reality-construction
in boards – is the direction in which their “social constructivism” points: Not
toward relativism and away from objectivism, as some suspect, but rather
away from technocracy and toward politics/civics. A political view narrowly
construed is unavoidable in mediating between the outlooks, demands and
expectations of multiple constituencies. What many have failed to see is that
it also captures the essential character of board governance.
I recently became aware of another form of this particular categorical
confusion (which is actually very pervasive today.) Annually, we take groups
of graduate students to observe the state legislature and participate in the
legislative process. The first and foremost impression reported from several
successive student cohorts in recent years has been that the legislature could
almost certainly conduct its business more efficiently and this would almost
certainly result in greater effectiveness – usually defined as passage of a
higher number of bills. The profoundly complex political challenge of selfgovernment by a sovereign people is, in their view, reduced to the technical
challenge of adopting more bills. Is the similarly complex question of
nonprofit self-governance receiving the same treatment?
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I fear we are applying much the same standards to the similarly
complex issue of nonprofit governance. The legal and philosophical basis for
creating nonprofit organizations can be summarized accurately as selfgovernance: An association or a corporation, whether it is organized for profit
or as a nonprofit, whether it is manufacturing automobiles, delivering social
services, or superintending marshlands and duck eggs, has an inherently
self-governing quality that remains unchanged when the organization
contracts to deliver contract services with a unit of government. The
misunderstanding of the nature of state government inherent in the view
that the purpose of the legislature can be measured in terms of the number
of bills it passes is entirely of a piece with the technocratic view that the
principal challenge of a nonprofit board is to govern more efficiently and
effectively.
A part of this challenge involves discerning the external environmental
demands and constraints that must be dealt with; the greater challenge (as
the Herman-Renz perspective notes) involves the “internal” challenges of
self-governance: mediating the environmental press of stakeholders’ claims
and demands into a viable enterprise. Yet, the thrust of much of our current
board research is on the question of how such self-governing boards –
ultimately responsible only to their stakeholders – can properly satisfy
standards and criteria established by external and self-appointed technical
experts who simply lack standing to offer the advice they insist upon giving.
Of course it is also the case that external funding sources that wish to
support a nonprofit organization have obligations and opportunities and – as
a contractual condition – can specify terms of board governance, which the
nonprofit is then free to accept or reject. I personally doubt, however, that
this extends to the level of general knowledge, such that nonprofit educators
should be assuming the role of guardians and teaching in our nonprofit
management programs how each and every nonprofit board ‘ought’ to conduct
its affairs, anymore than we should be concluding that legislatures need to
become more efficient in their passage of bills.

8. Can Accounting Information Provide Accountability?
One of the dirty little secrets of nonprofit management concerns the
general, all-purpose uselessness of nonprofit financial statements. Let me
stipulate immediately that nonprofit financial statements serve well the sole
elementary purpose of tracking resource flows. Thanks to the current state of
the art, nonprofit managers and boards seldom misplace or fail to notice
significant quantities of financial resources. Apart from this, however, for
guiding the essential tasks of management, notably pursuit of mission,
nonprofit financial statements are almost (but not quite) completely useless.
11

Modeled after the statements of the for-profit world under the terms of
enterprise accounting, nonprofit financial statements are supposed to yield
true and accurate portraits of the current condition and recent changes in the
value of a nonprofit organization. And in a certain, minimal, sense they do
that.
All manner of courses and workshops have been mounted over the
years to teach students and neophyte managers the real secrets of these
esoteric documents. The real secret is that for the typical small nonprofit
with assets under $5 million, there just isn’t all that much there. If you read
closely you can detect subtle patterns of change in spending on salaries, rent
or the phone bill. And if any of those engaged in criminal behavior or
skullduggery in the organization are sufficiently stupid or careless, they will
leave traces detectable in the financial statements. But you generally don’t
have to read nonprofit statements too closely to see that most nonprofits have
a very limited range of available resources, consisting mostly of some cash in
the bank, pretty shaky sources of financial inflows, some very ordinary (and
tightly constrained) expenditures and very limited debt. But, if you try to get
from their financial statements any real sense of where the organization
stands and what it is accomplishing – what it strives to be and to do, and how
well it is doing it, or any of the other real questions of accountability – you
almost certainly will fail and need to look elsewhere.
Some recent work on social accounting – particularly the work of Jack
Quarter, Laurie Mook and Mary Jane Richmond in Toronto and the fiscal
distress research mentioned above – has attempted to massage the existing
financial reporting schemes of accounting to produce more useful
management information. (Quarter, Mook and Richmoond, 2003) These are
certainly steps in the right direction.
There is also a variety of potentially interesting work underway on
other aspects of this problem. Nonprofit Management and Leadership has
published some interesting work by Gerhard Speckbacher, and will be
publishing some work by a group in Holland led by Ralf Caers on the
continuum of enterprise and stewardship approaches. Much more of this sort
of work needs to be done before this big question of financial accountability
can really be dealt with.

9. Should Foundations Change?
According to the latest information, there are now upwards of 70,000
foundations in the United States. Of course, only a relative handful of these
account for the lion’s share of assets, while the vast majority are small
foundations with limited assets and highly individualized giving programs.
The largest foundations have always had a major influence on nonprofit
12

organizations and sectors, especially in such matters as establishing and
defining the norm of program grants and their sometimes vastly exaggerated
claims of their own influence on social change.
I think there are at least three big questions that we should be asking
in this domain. The answers to these questions could have a profound impact
on the way we do business in the nonprofit world in the future. The first is
whether the case for program innovation is as strong as has been claimed in
the past, or should foundations be finding different ways to award funding
not involving specious claims to innovation. In particular, should these
foundations with their vast fortunes be at least selectively supporting the
normal everyday operations of nonprofits, and not always striving for the
(increasingly bogus) claims of the “next new thing”?
A second question about foundations is certainly a big question, and
somewhat more far reaching. That is the question of whether the five percent
rule is still appropriate. This rule mandates that foundations spend at least
five percent of their net earnings each year. Five percent was a compromise
level between those who favored more and those who favored no rule at all
(i.e., 0%). Now, after several decades of experience should we be asking more
questions about what has actually happened as a result of this rule, and
whether continuation of the rule, or changes are justified.
A final question about foundations is the most far reaching of all: And
that is whether the case for perpetual existence of foundations is a strong
one. Does anyone really want the Ford Foundation or the Carnegie
Corporation still orchestrating claims of innovation five centuries from now?
Or, should public law and tax policy be restructured to assure that
foundations spend themselves out in something like a generation or two?

10. How Will Public Administration Be Changed By Nonprofit Management?
Further, I would like to look at several related questions of specific
interest to public administration, public management, and public affairs. The
first of these questions is whether there is a legitimate public administration
claim to, or interest in, nonprofit management reaching beyond the
straightforward issue of purchase of services and contracting. Closely
associated with that question are the related issues of whether the ‘shadow
state’ represented by the nonprofit sector is actually a state at all, and
whether ‘third party governance’ is actually government in any meaningful
sense (Milward, 1994; Salamon, 1987; Wolch, 1990).
If public administration is going to continue and expand its interest in
the broad field of nonprofit organizations and the third sector, some attention
to questions such as these will be necessary.
13

11. Will Nonprofit Management Change The Relation Between Public
Administration and Allied Program Fields?
Another question which strikes me as important from my own
particular vantage points involves the degree to which interest in nonprofit
management can be expected to change the relation between public
administration and such related disciplines as social work, health care, the
arts and other disciplines and interests I would lump together here as “allied
program fields.” I ask this question as the holder of an MPA degree , with
almost 35 years experience in social work education, more than 25 of which
have been spent on the social work end of a dual-degree program with public
administration that actually formed the organizational core of a newly
created school. The basic question is whether there is a need to rethink the
curriculum relation between public administration and other professionally
oriented ventures – social work, education, health care, the arts,
environmental and community development to name just a few. This is
directly an issue of nonprofit management concern since so very of these
involve nonprofit organizations.

Conclusion
This list of the big questions of nonprofit management, like any such
list, is obviously a matter of personal preferences. Others might select some
or all of these issues, but would almost certainly select others as well. Placing
greater emphasis on human resources questions, for example, or on more
practical matters like improved ways to locate resources would almost
certainly rank higher on some lists. And I would welcome the opportunity to
consider those suggestions and arguments.
The point of an exercise like this is less a matter of finding or certifying
“the right answers” to the question of what are the big questions of nonprofit
management. It is more a matter of the thought and discussion such openended questions provoke. Readers should consider themselves challenged to
consider such questions and compose their own lists of big questions.
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